The importance of categorical reasoning in human cognition is well-established in psychology and cognitive science, and one of the most important functions of categorization is to facilitate prediction. This paper provides a model of optimal categorization. In the beginning of each period a subject observes a two-dimensional object in one dimension and wants to predict the object's value in the other dimension. The subject partitions the space of objects into categories. She has a data base of objects that were observed in both dimensions in the past. The subject determines what category the new object belongs to on the basis of observation of its …rst dimension. The subject predicts that its value in the second dimension will be equal to the average value among the past observations in the corresponding category. At the end of each period the second dimension is observed and the observation is stored in the data base. The main result is that the optimal number of categories is determined by a trade-o¤ between (a) decreasing the size of categories in order to enhance category homogeneity, and (b) increasing the size of categories in order to enhance category sample size.
Introduction
The importance of categorical reasoning in human cognition has been demonstrated in numerous psychological studies. For overviews of the voluminous literature see e.g. Laurence and Margolis (1999) , or Murphy (2002) . Categorization matters in many economic contexts. In …nancial markets the phenomenon of "style investing" (Bernstein (1995) , Barberis and Shleifer (2003) ) refers to the practice of allocating funds among classes of assets rather than to individual assets. Also, rating agencies categorize …rms to re ‡ect the probability that a …rm will default on its debt. It has even been claimed that the rating agencies manipulated their categories (ratings) in a way that was critical in the recent …nancial crisis (Coval et al. (2009) ). In consumer markets, price discrimination is a kind of categorization that has been extensively studied by economists, but other forms of categorization are also important. Consumers categorize goods and services when deciding what to purchase, and this leads to segmentation of markets (Smith (1965)) .
1 Firms may then use di¤erent marketing and pricing strategies in order to take advantage of how consumers categorize goods (Urban et al. (1993) , Punj and Moon (2002) ).
In the psychological literature it is widely acknowledged that an important function of categories is to facilitate predictions about properties that are not immediately observable (Anderson (1990) ).
2 Prediction on the basis of categorical reasoning is relevant in situations where one has to predict the value of a variable on the basis of one's previous experience with similar situations, but where the past experience does not include any situation that was identical to the present situation in all relevant aspects. In such situations one must consider both one's experience of what happened in previous situations, and how similar those situations were to the present situation. One way to do this is to divide the experienced situations into categories, such that situations in the same category are similar to each other. When a new situation is encountered one determines what category this situation belongs to, and the past experiences in this category are used to make a prediction about the current situation. Two stylized features of this process need to be stressed -and are incorporated into the formal model below: First, predictions about a particular category are generally formed only on the basis of objects that were put into that category in the past, not on the basis of objects that were put into other categories. Evidence for this is provided e.g. by Malt et al. (1995) and Murphy and Ross (1994) . Second, a prediction about a particular object is generally based only on what category the object belongs to, and does not take into account within-category correlations between properties. This means that roughly the same prediction is made for all objects in the same category. Evidence for this is provided e.g. by Krueger and Clement (1994) . 3 Related to this there are also studies of inductive inference on the basis of categories (e.g. Rips (1975) and Osherson et al. (1990) ).
Despite the importance of categorical reasoning in human cognition and its relevance for economic decisions, explicit models of categorization have been very rare in economics until recently. In this paper I ask which categorizations are optimal in the sense that they minimize prediction error -a notion that is made precise below. In particular, I wish to derive the optimal number of categories without imposing any exogenous costs and bene…ts of categories. Instead both costs and bene…ts are derived endogenously from the objective of making accurate predictions. The advantage of …ne grained categorizations is that objects in a category are similar to each other. The advantage of coarse categorizations is that a prediction about a category is based on a large number of observations. Comparative statics reveal how the optimal categorization depends on the number of observations as well as on the frequency of objects with di¤erent properties. To the best of my knowledge this is the …rst paper to investigate categorizations that are optimal from the point of view of prediction. 4 Related literature, including Fryer and Jackson (2008) , Al-Najjar and Pai (2009) and Peski (2007) is discussed below.
The dominant view within psychology is that the number of categories (the coarseness of the categorization) is determined by another trade-o¤ (Medin (1983) ). Like in this paper, the bene…t of small categories is supposed to be within-category homogeneity of objects. But, unlike this paper, the bene…t of having a fewer larger categories is supposed to be that one needs to observe fewer properties of an object in order to categorize it as belonging to a large category. A virtue of the explanation put forward in this paper is that it connects a main purpose of categorization, namely prediction, both with the value of many small categories and with the value of a few large categories.
Why should we be interested in optimal categorizations? From an evolutionary perspective we would expect humans to have developed categories, and categorization procedures, that tend to result in categorizations that generate predictions that induce behavior that maximize …tness. It seems reasonable to assume that …tness is generally increasing in how accurate the predictions are. For instance, a subject encountering a poisonous plant will presumably be better o¤ if she predicts that the plant is indeed poisonous, rather than nutritious. For this reason we would expect to …nd that humans employ categorizations that are at least approximately optimal, in the sense that they minimize prediction error. Note that the set-up does not presume any natural kinds Quine (1969) . There does not have to exist and objectively true categorization "out there". The optimal categorization is a framework we impose on our environment in order to predict it.
The model focuses on a subject who lives for a certain number of periods. First she goes through a learning phase and then a prediction phase. In each period of the learning phase she observes an object, represented by a pair of numbers (x; y). All objects are independently drawn from the same distribution, and are stored in a data base. The set of all objects is partitioned into di¤erent categories, such that each object's category membership is determined by its x-value. In the beginning of each period of the prediction phase the subject encounters a new object and observes the x-value but not the y-value. The y-value has to be predicted with the help of the object's x-value and the data base of past experiences. The new object is put in one of the categories on the basis of its xvalue. The empirical mean y-value, of the previously experienced objects in that category, serves as prediction for the y-value of the new object. At the end of the period, after the prediction has been made, the y-value is revealed and the information is added to the data base.
5
To …x ideas, think of a physician who encounters a new patient in each period. The x-value could represent information about a patient's personal characteristics such as weight, blood-pressure, or aspects of the patient's medical history. The y-value could represent some dimension of the patient's future health. During the learning phase the physician goes to medical school and develops a set of categories while observing various patients' characteristics together with their subsequent health state. In the prediction phase she works in a hospital: In the beginning of each period she receives information about a patient's personal characteristics, and has to make a prediction about some aspect of the patient's health. In order to make such a prediction she assigns the new patient to a category and predicts that the outcome for this patient will be like the empirical average outcome among previous patients in that category. At the end of each period she can observes the outcome for the current patient.
Prediction error is measured as the squared di¤erence between the prediction and the actual y-value of the object. Using the probability density function over the set of objects one can de…ne the expected prediction error of a categorization. Expectation is taken over the set of data bases that the subject may encounter. The expected prediction error is minimized by an optimal categorization. This is the relevant notion of optimality for the many categories that are learned early in life through socialization and education. From an evolutionary perspective we expect humans to have developed, and to pass on, categorizations that minimize prediction error in the relevant environments. In other cases we develop new categories only after having accumulated a data base. In this case an evolutionary perspective implies that we should expect to …nd that humans employ categorization procedures that result in categorizations that are at least approximately optimal, in the sense that they minimize prediction error. An alternative notion of optimality for this case is developed in section 3.3.
The main result of this paper is that the optimal number of categories is determined by a trade-o¤ between the value of within-category similarity of objects and the value of having many stored observations in each category. Increasing the number of categories has two e¤ects. (a) The average size of each category decreases and thus the di¤erences between objects that belong to the same category will be relatively small. (b) The average number of experienced objects in each category decreases. Thus generalizations about a category are based on a smaller sample, making inferences from observed objects to future cases less reliable. Note that this trade-o¤ does not depend on any exogenous cost of categories. The trade-o¤ sheds light on the phenomenon of basic-level categories, which has received much attention from psychologists; the most salient level of categorization is neither the most …ne-grained, nor the most general level of categorization (Rosch et al. (1976) ). The model can also explain why experts tend to have a more …ne grained conceptual structure than laymen (Tanaka and Taylor (1991) , Johnson and Mervis (1998) ). Furthermore, comparative statics with respect to the distribution of objects with di¤er-ent properties show that (i) the larger the variability in the y-dimension, the larger is the optimal number of categories, and (ii) the more frequent objects in one subset of the x-dimension are, the larger is the optimal number of categories in that subset. In particular, assuming that the relationship between x-and y-values is given by a linear regression model, the optimal number of categories is decreasing in the variance of the error term and increasing in the slope of the regression line. Finally some extensions of the model are discussed: The possibility of choosing in what category to make observations is investigated and related to the interplay of observation and concept formation in science. It is also shown that in some cases it is bene…cial to have a categorization that is vague in the sense that some objects do not belong to any category (cf. Lipman (2006) ).
It should be emphasized that the inference, from properties of objects in the data base, to the unobserved property of the present object, is not Bayesian. In particular, the subject does not have a prior about an object's properties before it is categorized. On the contrary, the model of this paper is intended to shed some light on how priors are generated. When an object is categorized, the data base is used to form a point prediction about the new object, in a non-Bayesian, frequentist way. This point prediction should be interpreted as a prior (point) belief. One could also think of a more complex model where the data base is used to form probabilistic beliefs, i.e. the prediction for objects in a certain category takes the form of a density over Y . argue that Bayesian decision theory needs to be complemented with a theory of belief formation that accounts for how priors are formed. They argue that the vast majority of decision problems are such that there is too little information to adopt a prior that is based on inferences from cases that are identical (in relevant dimensions) to the present case, and yet there is too much information to apply a symmetric prior based on the principle of insu¢ cient reason. Related to this, Binmore (2007) argues that the Bayesian approach is inappropriate in "large worlds", i.e. decision problems involving large state spaces, and claims that we need a theory of belief formation in such settings. It is hoped that this paper may provide a step towards such a theory. (For a discussion of these matters see also Morris (1995).) Categories are closely related to concepts. Categories can be said to be de…ned by concepts in the sense that an object belongs to a category if an only if it falls under the corresponding concept. Conversely, categorization is one of the most important functions of concepts (see Solomon et al. (1999) about other functions). One might suggest that we use categories because language is categorical and say that a categorization is optimal if it is induced by a language that is optimal in some sense. Language is undoubtedly important in shaping our concepts and categories, but concepts came prior to language in evolution -there are animals that use concepts even though they do not use language -and children can use certain concepts before they have a language.
6 Therefore I suggest that we try to explain the use of categories without reference to language. In addition to this, a language usually allows many di¤erent categorizations of the same subject matter. Therefore the optimal categorization is under-determined by the demands of communication.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and de…nes prediction error and optimality. The results are developed in section 3, and discussed in section 4. Section 5 reviews related literature, and section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix, section 7.
Model

Subject and Objects
A subject lives for T periods; …rst a learning phase of L < T periods, and then a prediction phase of T L periods. In each period t 2 f1; :::; T g she encounters an object, which is represented by a point v t = (x t ; y t ) in a two-dimensional Euclidean space V = X Y . The set X is a closed interval [a; b] on the real line, and the set Y can be any interval on the real line. All objects are drawn independently according to a continuous probability density function f :
7 All experienced objects are stored in a data base, so at the beginning of any period t > 1 the subject has a data base v t 1 = (v 1 ; :::; v t 1 ) 2 V t 1 . In each period t 2 f1; :::; Lg of the learning phase the subject observes each object in both dimensions. In the beginning of each period t 2 fL+1; :::; T g of the prediction phase she observes the x-value, x t , of an object v t , and not its y-value, y t . She makes a prediction about y t on the basis of x t , and the data base v t 1 . At the end of the period uncertainty is resolved; the subject observes y t , and updates the data base. Thus learning does not only occur in the learning phase but continues through the whole life time.
The set-up described here can be extended to an n = n x + n y dimensional Euclidean space V = X Y , where the subspace X R nx is compact and convex. For simplicity I develop my results for the case of one observable and one unobservable dimension; n x = n y = 1. 
Categories
A category C i is a subset of V . A categorization is a …nite set of categories C = fC 1 ; :::; C k g that constitutes a partitioning of V . Let X i be the projection of C i to X. Since the category membership of an object only depends on the object's x-value, the collection of sets fX 1 ; :::; X k g form a partitioning of X, and we can write C i = X i Y . Each set X i is assumed to be the union of …nitely many intervals. 9 The relative size of categories is constrained by some (small) number 2 (0; 1) such that Pr (x 2 X i ) = Pr (x 2 X j ) > for all i and j. For the case of a …nite number of categories this implies that all categories have positive probability. (When the number of categories goes to in…nity the assumption implies that no category becomes relatively in…nitely larger than another category.) The set of feasible categorizations is denoted . 10 7 By letting V ar (yjx) = 0 for all x 2 X, the model can accommodate the special case of a deterministic relationship between X and Y . This would describe a situation where the subject knows all the factors that in ‡uence the y-value except for the factor that is represented by X.
8 Although it would require more modi…cations, it should also be possible to generalize the results to the case of a set Y that is not an interval. For instance, if one wants to predict the probability of a stock market crash in a particular country it would be natural to let Y = f0; 1g.
9 If categories are only composed of one interval the categories are required to be convex. Gärdenfors (2000) argues that we should expect the extension of natural concepts to be convex on the grounds that convex concepts are easier to learn than non-convex concepts. Warglien and Gärdenfors (2008) argue that it will be easier for communicating parties to agree on a joint meaning if the concepts are convex. Thus a restriction to convex categories might be natural for certain kinds of concepts but I will work with the more general assumption that the categories are the union of …nitely many intervals. 10 The model allows a for many di¤erent sets to constitute categories. There is evidence that human categorization is indeed characterized by such ‡exibility (Ashby and Waldron (1999) , McKinley and Nosofsky (1995) ).
It might seem problematic to assume that categories in the same categorization are mutually exclusive, since we have many categories that are not mutually exclusive. This is the case for hierarchically organized concepts such as the two categories of stone and granite. However, we generally do not use such overlapping categories for the same prediction tasks. If I am interested in whether an object will burn when thrown on the …re I might categorize the object as made of stone rather than wood, and infer that it will not burn. In this context it is useless to know whether the object is of granite or not. But if I want to build a house it may be useful to employ a narrower categorization of materials, since granite is more solid than e.g. limestone.
In section 4.4 I investigate what happens when one allows for categorizations that are not jointly exhaustive (but mutually exclusive).
Prediction
For each category C i 2 C, and for date t, the subject has a predictionŷ it about the y-value of objects in that category. As discussed above, it will be assumed that the prediction equals the mean of all previously experienced objects in that category. If the data base for a certain category is empty then the prediction for that category is equal to the mean of all previously encountered objects. Let
This is the set of dates, prior to date t, at which objects in category C i were observed. Let m it = jD it j, so that
This means that when the data base does not contain any objects in the category that object v t belongs to, then the prediction for this object is made on the basis of all objects currently in the data base. This seems like a natural assumption, but one could make other assumptions, and this would not a¤ect the results of the paper, except proposition 8. The reason is that most results concern the case of a large number of observations relative to the number of categories, so that the probability of an empty category is negligible.
One can also modify the model more radically and assume that the subject always has at least one object in each category. Formally this can be done by assuming that the agent is endowed with these observations together with the categories, in period 1. Again, almost all the results will go through under this alternative assumption, the only exception being proposition 8.
Prediction Error and Optimality
For any object v t that the subject may encounter there is a unique category C i such that v t 2 C i . For any data base v t 1 2 V t 1 that the subject may have at date t the prediction y it is then determined according to the de…nition above. The prediction error is measured as the squared Euclidean distance between the predicted valueŷ it and the true value y t : De…nition 1 For any data base v t 1 and any new object v t 2 C i the prediction error is
At time t the (unconditional) expected prediction error of categorization C is
Here expectation is taken over objects in V and over data bases in V t 1 . Summing over the T L prediction tasks that the subject has to perform, one can de…ne the total expected prediction error of a categorization.
De…nition 2 The total expected prediction error EP E
This is used to de…ne the notion of an optimal categorization: De…nition 3 An optimal categorization is a categorization C 2 that minimizes EP E (C; T; L). and de…ne
Using this one can show.
Lemma 1
The expected prediction error for a categorization C, conditional on a data base v t 1 , is
This expression reveals the basic trade-o¤ that determines the optimal number of categories. The term V ar (y i ) measures how similar one can expect objects in the same category to be with respect to distance in the y-dimension. The term (ŷ it i ) 2 measures how close predictions are to the actual averages of the corresponding categories. The optimal categorization strikes a balance between the goal of having a low within category variance and the goal of estimating the category mean correctly.
Fix the date t and take expectation of EP E (C; v t 1 ) with respect to the data bases of size t 1. Then one obtains:
Lemma 2 The expected prediction error for a categorization C, at time t, is
where m it has a binomial distribution
It is di¢ cult to derive general results about the optimal categorization unless L or T is large (though …nite). The di¢ culties partly stem from the binomial expression in EP E (C; t) and partly from the fact no assumptions are made about f except that it is continuous. Therefore most of the results presented below will make the assumption that L, or T are su¢ ciently large. This should not be a problem, because during the process of learning concepts and categories as a child or student, a subject accumulates a large data base. The categorization abilities of the adult subject should then indeed be captured by results proved for the case of a large but …nite data base.
It will be fruitful to decompose the within-category variance in the y-dimension, V ar (y i ), into the contribution of the within-category average conditional variance
and the within-category variance of the conditional expected value
The following lemma establishes their connection:
Lemma 3 The within-category variance is the sum of the within-category average conditional variance, and the within-category variance of the conditional expected value;
Before providing results regarding optimal categorizations, I establish that such categorizations exist:
Lemma 4 Suppose that the number of categories and the number of unconnected subsets of each category are uniformly bounded above. Then, for any t, v t 1 , and L < T , there exist solutions to the problems of minimizing EP E (C; v t 1 ), EP E (C; t), or EP E (C; T; L), with respect to C.
It can be noted that there is no guarantee that any of these solutions are unique, thus allowing for a (mild) form of conceptual relativism.
Properties of Optimal Categorizations
The following proposition establishes that if the learning phase is su¢ ciently long in relation to the prediction phase then the optimal number of categories is less than the number of observations made during the observation phase. Also, for any given length of the learning phase, if the prediction phase is su¢ ciently long, then the optimal number of categories is less than the number of observations made during the life time. Finally, as the number of observations goes to in…nity, the average number of object in each category goes to in…nity.
The following is an immediate consequence of the fact that it is never optimal to have more categories than objects:
Corollary 1 If t is large enough then there exists a solution to the problems of minimizing EP E (C; v t 1 ), or EP E (C; t), even when one does not assume a uniform bound on the number of categories. Also, if L is large enough then the same holds for minimization of EP E (C; T; L).
The next proposition says that if the learning phase, or the prediction phase, is su¢ -ciently long, then the optimal categorization has more than one category, provided that the conditional mean E (yjx) is not constant over X.
Proposition 2 If f is such that there are two disjoint and mutually exclusive sets E; F X, with E (yjx 2 E) 6 = E (yjx 2 F ), then there are …nite
0 then any optimal categorization has k > 1.
Propositions 1 and 2 together provide an explanation for why we typically employ categorizations that are neither maximally …ne grained -with one object in each category -nor maximally general -with all object in the same category. This is discussed further section 4.1.
In the special case when the conditional distribution is constant over X, it is optimal to have only one category, regardless of the size of the data base:
for all x; x 0 2 X then any optimal categorization has k = 1. Now consider two subjects 1 and 2, with di¤erent learning phase L and di¤erent total number of observations T . Assume T 2 > T 1 and L 2 > L 1 . (In section 4.2 subjects 1 and 2 are interpreted as being a layman and an expert, respectively.) The model predicts that if the di¤erences between the two subjects are large enough then it is optimal for the individuals to have k 2 > k 1 .
The next three propositions concern the relationship between the density f (x; y) and the optimal categorization. The …rst result considers the marginal density over X, i.e. f (x). The more common objects from one subset of X are, the more …ne-grained should the optimal categorization for that subset be:
Proposition 5 Consider a proper subset E X, and two densities f 0 and f 1 , such that f 0 (yjx) = f 1 (yjx) for all x 2 E. Suppose there is some > 1 such that f 0 (x) = f 1 (x) for all x 2 E. Then the lowest optimal number of categories in E is at least as large with f 1 as with f 0 . This is a generalization of the result in Fryer and Jackson (2008) , that less frequent objects will be categorized more coarsely. Their result assumes a …xed number of categories, whereas mine does not. They relate the result to the possibility that ethnic minorities will be categorized more coarsely than majorities. This will tend to lead to more stereotypical predictions about the minority than the majority.
The next result concerns the e¤ect of the conditional variance, V ar (yjx), on the optimal categorization.
Proposition 6 Consider two densities f 0 and
, then the lowest optimal number of categories is at least as large with f 1 as with f 0 .
We saw above that V ar (y i ) is the sum of E [V ar (yjx) jx 2 X i ] and V ar (E [yjx] jx 2 X i ). Proposition 6 concerns comparative statics with respect to the former term. Comparative statics with respect to the latter term requires more detailed assumptions about the distribution f . For this reason I now restrict attention to the following special case: Suppose X = [0; 1] and Y = R and suppose that the relation between them is described by the classical linear regression model;
where z N (0;
2 ). Furthermore assume that x is uniformly distributed on X. Assume also that the subject only makes one prediction during her life, i.e. T L = 1 (extension to T L > 1 is straightforward but does not add insight). Finally, for simplicity, also assume that subjects are endowed with one observation in each category already in period 1, as mentioned in section 2.3. (The results become more tractable with this assumption but the general insight is unaltered.) Under these assumptions we have the following result:
Proposition 7 (a) For any T and L the number of categories in the optimal categorization is unique and all categories have the same length along the x-axis: If the optimal number of categories is k, then the optimal categories satisfy X i = [a i ; b i ), and b i a i = 1=k for all i < k. The k th category satis…es
The optimal number of categories is increasing in and decreasing in 2 .
Recall that for the linear regression model it holds that = Cov (x; y) V ar (y) , so increasing covariance of x and y increases the optimal number of categories. Increasing the conditional variance of y decreases the optimal number of categories. This result is very intuitive: If the covariance is large then the categories have to be narrow in order to keep the heterogeneity of objects in each category within limits. If the variance of y is large then (in line with proposition 6) the categories have to be broad in order to contain enough objects to allow reasonably accurate estimates of the means of each category.
Categorization Conditional on a Data Base
An evolutionary perspective suggests that, we should expect that humans have developed categorizations that minimize prediction error for the kind of data bases that one can expect to encounter in life. Similarly one would expect that over time a profession has developed a categorization that minimize prediction error for the kind of data bases that members of that profession tend to encounter. The de…nition of an optimal categorization, as minimizing unconditional expected prediction error, is intended to capture this evolutionary adaptation. However, as mentioned in the introduction, it also happens that new concepts are developed after a data base has been accumulated -e.g. for some area of investigation where one did not have useful concepts before. An evolutionary perspective then suggests that humans might have developed adaptive processes for categorization of given data bases. Such processes would tend to result in categorizations that minimize expected prediction error conditional on the data base. The expected prediction error conditional on a data base, EP E (C; v t 1 ), was de…ned above. It can be used to de…ne a second notion of optimality.
De…nition 4
The optimal categorization conditional on a data base v t 1 , is the categorization C 2 that minimizes EP E (C; v t 1 ).
An important question is of course what algorithms or rules of thumb that a subject will use to determine what the optimal categorization conditional on a data base v t 1 , is. A categorizing subject should not be assumed to know the distribution f , because if the subject did know f , then there would be no need to base predictions on categorization, rather than using knowledge of the density f directly. Still, we would expect the rules of thumb to yield approximately optimal categorizations. Thus, as analysts we might be willing to assume that subjects act as if they optimized on the basis of knowledge of f . Then we can predict that subjects will use categories that are optimal in the sense of de…nition 4.
A more explicit, and realistic, model would assume that the subject follows some other rule than directly choosing a category that minimizes EP E (C; v t 1 ). One rule of thumb that seems reasonable is to choose a categorization C that minimizes some estimator of EP E (C; v t 1 ). For example, one could use the following estimator:
De…nition 5 The sample prediction error for a categorization C conditional on a data base v t 1 , is
It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the properties of this rule for creating categories given a data base, but it seems likely that many of the above results will carry over to this case.
Discussion
The Optimal Number of Categories and the Basic Level
In studies of concepts and categorization with hierarchically organized concepts (e.g. animal -bird -robin) it is found that there is a privileged level in the hierarchy, called the basic level. Generally this level is named spontaneously in categorization tasks, learned …rst by children, and is in other ways salient (Rosch et al. (1976) ). The basic level is neither the most general level nor the most detailed level (e.g. bird rather than the superordinate category animal or the subordinate category robin). If categories are useful because they facilitate prediction then it might seem that it should be optimal to have an in…nitely …ne grained conceptual structure, since the narrower a category is, the more precise are the predictions that can be inferred from category membership. For example, if something is categorized as a bird then one can infer that it lays eggs and has wings, but if it is categorized (more …nely) as a penguin, then one can also infer that it cannot ‡y but can dive. Since we do not use in…nitely …ne-grained category structures there must be some other factor that decreases the bene…t of narrow categories. I have argued that this factor is constituted by the need to have a su¢ ciently large sample in each category to generalize from.
The dominant view in psychology has instead been that the cost of …ne grained categorizations has to do with the di¢ culty of categorizing objects into …ne grained categories: In order to make a more …ne-grained categorization one has to observe more properties of an object.
11 A virtue of the explanation put forward in this paper is that it connects a main purpose of categorization, namely prediction, both with the value of many small categories and with the value of a few large categories. 12 In the end it is of course an empirical question as to which theory is the best. However, it is di¢ cult to come up with a clean test. The reason is that lower level categories both contain less objects and are associated with more stringent conditions for application. Experimentally one could try to …nd a superordinate category and a subordinate category which are equally easy to apply. The conventional psychological explanation would then predict that the basic level will not be the superordinate of these two categories. In contrast, my explanation would predict the superordinate category to be basic if the subordinate category contains too few exemplars, or is associated with too much variance. Of course the explanations could be viewed as complementary. Both may describe forces that shape our categorizations.
Experts and Laymen
Experts tend to have a more …ne grained conceptual structure than laymen (Tanaka and Taylor (1991) , Johnson and Mervis (1998) ). This can be explained in the present model, with the help of proposition 4. Consider a layman with a learning phase of length L 1 and a prediction phase of T 1 L 2 periods. Suppose the optimal number of categories for this person is k 1 . An expert is distinguished by that she goes through more extensive training, L 2 , or a longer prediction phase T 2 L 1 , than the layman The model predicts that if these di¤erences between an expert and a layman, then it is optimal for the expert to have larger number of categories than the layman; k 2 > k 1 .
This may also explain why some populations use a more …ne-grained category structure than other populations: For instance, people in traditional subsistence cultures tend to between maximizing within category similarity and minimizing between-category similarity. Rosch et al. (1976) de…ne cue validity as the conditional probability that an object belongs to a certain category, given that it has a certain feature (cue). This measures how easy it is to categorize an object as belonging to the category. Cue validity is always maximized for the highest, most inclusive, level in the hierarchy; Murphy (1982) . Medin (1983) de…nes category validity as the conditional probability that an object has a feature given that it belongs to a certain category. This measures the predictive power of categories, and is maximized for the most speci…c categories, at the bottom of the hierarchy. He suggests that the basic level represents the optimal trade o¤ between cue validity and category validity, i.e. between easy classi…cation and sharp predictions. Jones (1983) formalized this suggestion as the maximization of the product of cue validity and category validity. Corter and Gluck (1992) incorporate the utility of communication into this approach. A related explanation, closer to the "theory theory" of concepts, is provided by Markman and Wisniewski (1997) . 12 Recently, Pothos and Chater (2002) put forward an account of categorization that builds on the idea that the simplest categorization will be preferred. Simplicity is identi…ed with code length. In their model there is a trade-o¤ between reducing the number of categories (thereby simplifying the representation of similarity of categories) and reducing the number of objects within each category (thereby simplifying the representation of the within-category similarity). Thus on this account the optimal categorization is one that maximizes simplicity, rather than predictive success. There are some results establishing a link between simplicity and prediction (see Chater (1999) ). Another link between prediction and simplicity is explored by Gilboa and Samuelson (2008) . Their approach is connected with the present paper since not using too many categories can be a way of keeping a theory simple.
have more speci…c biological categories than e.g. American college students (Berlin et al. (1973) , Solomon et al. (1999) ).
Interplay of Observation and Categorization
Consider a scientist who wants both to develop new theories, in the form of new concepts, and to make new observations, in order to make better predictions. The scientist can in ‡uence what observations she makes by choosing to perform some experiments rather than others. For a given categorization the above model can be modi…ed to allow the subject to choose in what categories to make her observations, with the purpose of minimizing the expected prediction error EP E (C; v t 1 ). Thus the subject chooses the numbers of observations in di¤erent categories
The …rst equality uses lemma 1 and the second equality uses the same logic as the proof of lemma 2. Immediately one sees that, for a given categorization, it is optimal to choose to make observations in categories that have a large probability mass and/or a large variance. It is also evident that the marginal bene…t of new observations is decreasing.
Forming new categories and concepts is intellectually demanding. More speci…cally it seems reasonable to assume that this cost is not continuous in the magnitude of the conceptual change; even small changes are likely to involve some strictly positive minimal costs. Thus there is reason not to perform recategorization continuously, rather it is optimal to perform such activities occasionally. Directly after a recategorization the bene…t of new observations is high and e¤orts are rationally directed at performing experiments within the framework of the current categorization. After a while the marginal bene…t of new observations has declined su¢ ciently much to make it more valuable to invest e¤orts in category formation rather than observation. In this way periods of observation with …xed categories and periods of recategorization will alternate. Note the similarity with how Kuhn (1970) describes the interaction of normal science and scienti…c revolutions.
Vagueness
So far it has been assumed that all categorizations C 2 are partitionings of V . Thus all objects in V fall into some category. In the case of categories that are de…ned by vague concepts this is not a completely innocent assumption. If a concept is vague then there are objects that neither fall under the concept nor fall under its negation. For instance, the concept of a tall person is vague, since there are persons that we have trouble classifying as either tall or not tall. Thus the categories of tall and non-tall person do not jointly exhaust the set of all persons.
Generally, for vague categorizations there are objects that do not belong to any category, but are located in a "no mans land" between categories. For these objects there is no speci…c category that can serve as basis for predictions. A sensible way to treat such objects is to view them as belonging to a higher level category, corresponding to the whole set V . For instance, a person who is neither tall nor short is still a person. Predictions about such objects are thus based on all objects in the data base. The following proposition establishes that, depending on the category mean, one can decrease or increase expected prediction error by basing the prediction about the category on all objects, usingŷ t , rather than basing it just on the objects in that category, usingŷ it .
Proposition 8 There exists some …nite L 0 such that if L > L 0 then for any category C i 2 C with i 6 = , expected prediction error is increased by using the predictionŷ it rather thanŷ t . And if L > L 0 then for any category C i 2 C with i = , expected prediction error is decreased by using the predictionŷ it rather thanŷ t .
Thus if there is a category C i in C whose mean i is equal to the over all mean then one can decrease expected prediction error by employing a categorization that is vague in the sense that the objects in C i do not belong to any category in C. Hence proposition 8 says that it might be optimal to have a partially vague categorization. This can be contrasted with Lipman (2006) who argues that, according to standard models, vagueness is never optimal.
5 Related Literature
Formal Theories of Categorization
Fryer and Jackson (2008) consider a notion of optimal categorization. The model of their important paper has many similarities with the present model; objects are represented as vectors in some space of features, and the prediction about a new object in a category is based on the average of past objects in that category. But there are also some important di¤erences: First, the number of categories is exogenously given. Second, although the purpose of categorization is to generate predictions Fryer & Jackson do not de…ne optimality in terms of minimization of prediction error. Instead they de…ne the optimal categorization as the one that minimizes the sum of within-category di¤erences between objects that have already been encountered. Third, the probability of encountering different objects is not modeled.
13 As a consequence the trade-o¤ that is central to the present paper, cannot be formulated within their framework. Also they can not explore the comparative statics that I do. After the …rst version of the present paper was written (and presented in Copenhagen, November 14-15, 2008 ) it came to my attention that Al-Najjar and Pai (2009) (…rst version December 2008) have developed a model of coarse decision making, which discusses categorization. Their set up is somewhat di¤erent in some technical aspects, for instance they consider a …nite space of objects, and a …nite set of categorizations. They de…ne optimality in a di¤erent way than here (using the supremum norm). Their model builds on so-called Vapnik Chervonenkis theory while the present paper only uses basic statistics and probability theory. Regarding results, Al-Najjar & Pai show that when data is scarce then the optimal categorization has less categories than objects (data is always scarce in my model since V is in…nite and the data base …nite). However, they do not provide any results on what the categorization should look like, and they do not perform any comparative static analysis.
Another related paper is Peski (2007) . He intends to explain why categorization may be an optimal way to make predictions -i.e. the question is not what the optimal categorization looks like. But like in the present paper there is a trade-o¤ between …tting and over-…tting. However Peski's model makes some very restrictive assumptions: First of all, Peski argues for the usefulness of categorization by comparing a subject who makes predictions based on categorization with a subject who uses Bayesian updating. The Bayesian subject's prior over the states of the world is symmetric, in the sense that the prior is invariant with respect to relabeling of objects and properties. Under this assumption the predictions of the categorizing subject asymptotically approaches the predictions of the Bayesian subject. However, in order for it to be sensible to de…ne optimality in terms of what the Bayesian predicts, the symmetric prior must be objectively correct. This is an extreme assumption. (Also note that this result only holds asymptotically whereas I de…ne optimality for any …nite number of observations.) Second, properties are modeled as being discrete. Consequently object similarity is measured as the number of shared properties, and there is no notion of similarity between objects that do not share a property. In reality many properties come in degrees and people are able to judge similarity of properties. For instance a yellow object is judged to be more similar to an orange object than a blue object, and this corresponds to objective similarity in wave length. My purpose is to relate the objective distribution of objects to the way that we slice up the world in categories. It is then crucial to acknowledge that objects and properties are not uniformly distributed. It is also crucial to allow for similarity of properties. Partly because of this, Peski's model does not allow one to study comparative statics regarding the number of categories. Mullainathan (2002) provides a Bayesian model of categorization. There is an exogenously given set of types of objects. Each type is associated with a probability distribution over outcomes. A subject chooses a proper subset of these distributions, which correspond to the set of categories used. When a new object is encountered the subject pick the category that is most likely given the data she already has about that object. Then the distribution associated with that category is used for predictions about the object in question. There are many di¤erences compared to the present paper: There is an exogenous set of "true" categories and the subject has a prior about how objects are distributed within categories. Related to this, objects are allocated to categories on the basis of Bayesian inference.
Jehiel (2005) develops a notion of analogy based expectations equilibrium for extensive form games. Players bundle together the nodes of the opponents into analogy classes in order to predict the opponents' behavior. A player expects the same behavior in all nodes in an analogy class. In equilibrium these expectations are correct on average. The equilibrium is parameterized by the analogy classes, which are exogenous. Jehiel and Samet (2007) de…ne a notion of valuation equilibrium. Players bundle their own strategies into di¤erent similarity classes, when predicting their own payo¤s. The same payo¤ is expected for each strategy in the same similarity class, and in equilibrium the expectations are correct on average. The similarity classes are exogenous, even though Jehiel and Samet discuss the possibility of endogenizing them.
There is a literature, starting with Dow (1991) , that examines the optimal way to partition a state space in the face of limited memory. In these models the number of cells in the partition is determined exogenously by the bound on memory. (See chapter 5 of Rubinstein (1998) for a general discussion of optimal partitions.) The subject is assumed to have a prior de…ned on the state space. In the categorization model discussed in this paper the subject's prior probabilities are instead generated from observations.
In the psychology literature the closest related theory is the "rational theory" of Anderson (1991) . In his model predictions about objects in a given category are based on all objects in all categories, thus making the distinct purpose of categories somewhat di¢ cult to understand. The model is Bayesian and postulates that subjects have a prior about the category structure of the encountered objects. In particular subjects have a prior about how similar object are in order to belong to the same category, as well as a prior about the probability that objects in a certain category exhibit di¤erent properties. As a result the categorization depends critically on assumptions about priors. Finally, Anderson unable to formulate the trade o¤ that determines the number of categories according to the present paper.
In the …eld of machine learning there are several models related to categorization. The approach most relevant to the question of optimality raised in this paper, is cluster analysis (for a review see e.g. Jain et al. (1999) ). Still, there are some important points of di¤erence. In cluster analysis it is assumed that there is a certain set of distributions generating data, represented as points in some multidimensional space. The test of optimality (if the question is addressed at all) is to be able to distinguish which observations that where drawn from which distribution. The goodness of …t of a model for allocating objects to the di¤erent distributions can then be assessed with some information criterion from statistics. In this sense the approach assumes the existence of a given number of natural kinds, whereas mine does not. Another important di¤erence is that optimality is only evaluated with respect to the variables that are used to de…ne clusters. This means that optimality is not evaluated with respect a variable that is not observed when categorizing a new object. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995) develop a model of case-based decision making, which Gilboa and Schmeidler (2003) adapt to prediction problems; given a data base of past cases the subject's task is to rank the likelihood of di¤erent outcomes in a new case. Gilboa et al. (2006) provide an axiomatization of a similarity based prediction rule for the case of predicting a real-valued variable y. The prediction rule presumes the existence of a measure of similarity between cases. It states that the value of y in the case at hand will be equal to the similarity weighted average of that variable in the past cases.
Similarity-Based Predictions
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The axiomatization assures that there exists such a similarity function if and only if the probability rankings made by the subject, given various data bases, satis…es certain axioms. However, the axiomatization only tells us that a similarity function exists, not what it looks like. This approach, in particular Gilboa et al. (2006) , is related to the present paper in an interesting way. One way of phrasing the di¤erence is to say that I consider a certain subset of similarity functions, namely category-based similarity functions. This is the set of functions that treat all cases in the same category as exactly similar to each other and treat a case in a category as completely dissimilar to any case outside that category. Furthermore, instead of axiomatizing this category-based similarity function I derive the optimal such similarity function. In discussing their similarity based approach to generation of priors, say: "An obvious question about this approach is that it may appear that the problem of …nding an appropriate probability has simply been replaced by the problem of …nding an appropriate similarity function"(p. 185). They suggest that this can be done empirically. The present paper instead tries to narrow down the problem by …rst acknowledging the importance of categorical reasoning, and then looking for the optimal way of forming categories. 16 
Conclusion
I have provided a framework for the study of optimal categorization for the purpose of making predictions. The optimal number of categories is endogenous to the model. A small category results in smaller variance of objects in that category. A large category leads to a large number of experienced objects in the category, thus improving the precision of the predictions of the category mean. Thus the optimal categorization strikes a balance between …tting and over-…tting. This can explain the fact that the privileged level of categorization -the so-called basic level -is neither the coarsest nor the …nest one. Comparative statics yield several predictions about how the optimal categorization varies with the number of observations and the distribution of objects. It would be interesting to test experimentally some of the predictions of the model that have not been tested before, such as the predictions that the optimal number of categories are increasing in the variance of the density. The model is simple but the insights should carry over to more general settings, e.g. multidimensional objects and predictions of discrete variables. Also the model could be applied to categorization of games and strategies -for instance, one could de…ne solution concepts for agents who form beliefs based on (optimal) categorization.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. We have
where the last equality uses the de…nition of f (yjx 2 X i ). Note that
Using this we have
The desired result follows from the facts that the second factor on the right hand side is equal to zero, and
Proof of Lemma 2. We have
The number of objects in a category, m it , has a binomial distribution as follows
Plugging this into the expression above yields the desired result.
Proof of Lemma 3. The equality
) is a standard result. Conditioning on x 2 X i is straightforward. A full proof can be obtained from the author upon request.
Proof of Lemma 4. Assume k < < 1 and assume that each X i is the union of at most intervals. Any categorization C with k categories can be described by a set of 1 points on [a; b] together with a mapping from the induced ( ) subintervals to the set f1; 2; :::; kg. Take any mapping from subintervals to f1; 2; :::; kg. Choosing an optimal categorization among the categorizations that are consistent with the mapping is equivalent to choosing a point z in the compact set Z = z 2 [a; b] 1 : z j z j+1 8j 2 f1; :::; 2g in order to minimize EP E (C; v t 1 ). Furthermore, since f is continuous in x, EP E (C; v t 1 ) is continuous in z. Hence by Weierstrass'maximum theorem there exists a solution z ( ). This was for a given mapping from subintervals to f1; 2; :::; kg. Since there are only a …nite number of mappings from subintervals to the set f1; 2; :::; kg. The desired result follows.
The following lemma is needed for the proof of proposition 1.
Lemma 5 Consider categorizations with k=t > 0. There is some > 0 such that
Proof of Lemma 5. Let p max = max i Pr (x 2 X i ) and p min = min i Pr (x 2 X i ). Note that p max < 1 (k 1) p min and since p min > p max , we have p max < 1 (k 1) p max or equivalently
for all t and all categorizations satisfying k = t. For all > 0, e 1 is strictly positive.
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Proof of Proposition 1. (a) (i) Write
For any t, let all sets X i be intervals of length (b a) =k. If k ! 1 then the above 17 The lemma would not hold if we did not impose the restriction that there is some (0; 1) such that Pr (x 2 X i ) = Pr (x 2 X i ) > for all i and j. Roughly speaking the reason is that one could then let some categories go to zero much faster than other categories so that the expected number of objects in the slowly decreasing categories goes to in…nity.
Hence for any " > 0 there is a …nite k 0 such that for any k > k 0 (and any t) one can partition X such that
Thus for any " > 0 there is a …nite k 0 such that for any k > k 0 (and any L and T ) one can partition X such that
(ii) Consider EP E (C; t) and …x k. If one lets t ! 1 so that k=t ! 0, then one obtains
for all categories, and hence
Pr (x 2 X i ) V ar (y i ) , so for any " > 0 and any …nite k, there is a …nite t 0 , such that if t > t 0 then one can partition X in a way such that
Thus for any " > 0 and any …nite k there are …nite
(iii) From (i) and (ii) it follows that for any " > 0 there are …nite numbers k 0 , L 0 and
(iv) Now I show that one cannot obtain such a low expected prediction error unless k < L. Consider EP E (C; t) and restrict attention to the set of categorizations with k t. We have min x2X V ar (yjx) > E (ŷ t i ) 2 jm it = 0 , so
Let k ! 1, implying t ! 1, and let Pr (x 2 X i ) ! 0 for all categories. Then, by (i) and lemma 5 there is some > 0 such that
Hence, there is some " such that for any L, and any categorization with k L categories, we have EP E (C; T; L)
(b) The proof of part (b) is very similar to the proof of part (a), and therefore omitted.
and still have k=t ! 1, so that according to (ii)
If instead one sets a strictly positive lower bound on k=t then according to lemma 5 there is some " > 0 such that
as t ! 1. Thus as t ! 1, EP E (C; t) is minimized by letting k=t ! 0. Hence for any L, as T ! 1, EP E (C; T; L) is minimized by letting k=T ! 0.
Proof of Corollary 1. According to proposition 1 the number of categories is optimally lower than T . Since T is …nite this number can be used instead of in the proof of lemma 4.
The proof of proposition 2 relies on the following lemma.
Lemma 6 Let A and B be disjoint intervals with Pr (x 2 A) > 0, and Pr (x 2 B) > 0.
We have E (yjx 2 A) 6 = E (yjx 2 B) if and only if
Pr (x 2 I) V ar (yjx 2 I) > 0.
Proof of Lemma 6. Recall
Pr (y and
Similarly for I 2 fA; Bg
Pr (y and x 2 I) (y E (yjx 2 I)) 2 dy.
Putting this together, and using
Pr (y and x 2 I) (y E (yjx 2 I))
where the weak inequality follows from the fact that the function
is minimized at z = E (yjx 2 I). The inequality is strict if E (yjx 2 A) 6 = E (yjx 2 B).
Proof of Proposition 2. Compare categorizations C 0 = fC ; C g and C 00 = fC g such that in C 00 all objects belong to the same category, C = V , while in C 0 objects from E belong to a category of its own, C = E Y , and all other objects belong to a category C = F Y . We know from before (proof of proposition 1) that for any " > 0 and any …nite k there is a …nite t 0 such that if t > t 0 then EP E (C 0 ; t) (Pr (x 2 E) V ar (y ) + Pr (x 2 F ) V ar (y )) < ",
It follows from lemma 6 that if E (yjx 2 E) 6 = E (yjx 2 F ) then
Hence, for su¢ ciently large t 0 (and hence su¢ ciently small ") we have EP E (C 0 ; t) < EP E (C 00 ; t). It follows that it L is su¢ ciently large or if T is su¢ ciently large, then EP E (C 0 ; T; L) < EP E (C 00 ; T; L).
Proof of Proposition 3. There are k t 1 categories. If
Suppose categorization C 0 has k 1 concepts and that categorization C 00 is identical except that category k 1 in C 0 is divided into two categories so that categorization C 00 has k concepts. Let X it denote the number of objects in category i at date t, for categorization C 0 and C 00 , respectively. We have
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof is brief since it uses a logic similar to that in the proof of proposition 1. Let C 0 be the categorization, with k 1 categories, that minimizes EP E (C; t 1 ) . To see what categorization C that minimizes EP E (C; t 2 ), …rst suppose, as a benchmark, that one uses the categorization C 0 , and obtains EP E (C 0 ; t 2 ). By choosing a categorization C 00 with a larger number of categories one can reduce
If t 2 t 1 is large enough then one can increase k and still decrease both
Thus if t 2 t 1 is large enough then one can increase k and thereby obtain EP E (C 00 ; t 1 ) < EP E (C 0 ; t 1 ) .
Conversely if t 2 t 1 is large enough then one cannot gain by reducing the number of categories and set k 2 < k 1 . It is straightforward to translate this reasoning about t 2 t 1 into statements about L 2 L 1 and T 2 T 1 .
Proof of Proposition 5. Restrict attention to the expected prediction error in the set E, denoted EP E E (C; t). Write EP E E;f (C; t) to make the dependence upon f explicit. Suppose C 0 is an optimal categorization of E at date t given f 0 , i.e C 0 2 arg min C2 EP E E;f 0 (C; t), and suppose that there is no other optimal categorization with a lower number of categories. This categorization C 0 strikes an optimal balance between the goal of having a few large categories in order to minimize the factors
and Pr (m it = 0) (one of each for each category), and the goal of having many small categories in order to minimize the factors V ar (y i ) (one for each category). Decreasing the number of categories will lead to an increase in at least some of the factors V ar (y i ) and a decrease in at least some of the factors
and Pr (m it = 0). The former e¤ect will dominate the latter so that the total e¤ect will be an increase in prediction error -otherwise C 0 would not be an optimal categorization with a minimal number of categories. (The e¤ect on the factors E (ŷ t i ) 2 jm it = 0 of increasing the number of categories is ambiguous, but if these terms are decreased by increasing the number of categories it still must be the case that the total e¤ect on expected prediction error, of increasing the number of categories, is positive.) Now suppose one uses the same categorization C 0 when the distribution is f 1 (rather than f 0 ). Then all the factors P t 1 r=1 Pr (m it = r) 1 r and Pr (m it = 0) are smaller under f 1 than under f 0 . But we have
and
so from the expressions for E [V ar (yjx) jx 2 X i ] and V ar (E [yjx] jx 2 X i ) (and lemma 3) one sees that all the factors V ar (y i ) and E (ŷ t i ) 2 jm it = 0 are the same under f 0 and f 1 . Also all the factors E (ŷ t i ) 2 jm it = 0 are una¤ected. Hence, keeping C 0 …xed, the only di¤erence between f 0 and f 1 is that the factors P t 1 r=1 Pr (m it = r) 1 r are smaller under f 1 than under f 0 . Since it was suboptimal to decrease the number of categories relative to C 0 under f 0 it must be (even more) suboptimal to decrease the number of categories relative to C 0 under f 1 .
Proof of Proposition 6. If L and T are su¢ ciently large then we can neglect the probability of empty categories. Write EP E f (C; t) to make the dependence on f explicit. Suppose C 0 is an optimal categorization at date t given f 0 , i.e C 0 2 arg min C2 EP E f 0 (C; t), and suppose that there is no other optimal categorization with a lower number of categories. This categorization C 0 strikes an optimal balance between the goal of having a few large categories in order to minimize the factors P t 1 r=1 Pr (m it = r) 1 r and the goal of having many small categories in order to minimize the factors V ar (y i ). Decreasing the number of categories will lead to an increase in at least some of the factors V ar (y i ) and a decrease in at least some of the factors P t 1 r=1 Pr (m it = r) 1 r
. The former will dominate the latter so that the total e¤ect will be an increase in prediction error -otherwise C 0 would not be an optimal categorization with a minimal number of categories.
If one uses the same categorization C 0 for f 1 then all the factors P t 1 r=1 Pr (m it = r) 1 r are the same under f 1 as under f 0 . Also all the factors V ar (E [yjx] jx 2 X i ) are the same under f 1 as under f 0 . But we have
for all categories in C 0 , so V ar f 0 (y i ) < V ar f 1 (y i ) for all categories in C 0 . Hence, when C 0 is kept the same then the only di¤erence between f 0 and f 1 is that the factors V ar (y i ) are larger under f 1 than under f 0 . Disregarding the probability of empty categories we have EP E f 1 (C; t) = EP E f 0 (C; t)
Pr (m it = r) 1 r ! .
By assumption EP E f 0 (C; t) is minimized by C 0 . The second term is strictly increasing in the number of categories. In total the minimal optimal number of categories will be weakly lower under f 1 than under f 0 .
Proof of Proposition 7. A longer version of this proof can be obtained from the author upon request. Note that the assumption that x is uniformly distributed on X, implies that f (x) = 1 for all x 2 X, and hence that f (x; y) = f (yjx). Then derive the variance of y in interval A i = [a i ; b i ). We have Using this we get, after a fair amount of manipulation,
(a) Now we show that the optimal categories are intervals on the x-axis. Take a categorization C where not all categories are convex. That means that without loss of generality one can assume that there is a category C such that X = [ S s=1 [a s ; b s ), with b s < a s+1 . Let EP E (C; t) denote the expected prediction error for objects in this category;
EP E (C; t) = V ar (y ) 1 + under categorization C the point p > a 1 was a boundary point between two categories then, under categorization C 0 this boundary is located at the point p + P S s=1 (b s a s ). Let EP E (C 0 ; t) denote the expected prediction error for objects in category C 2 C 0 ;
EP E (C 0 ; t) = V ar (y ) 1 + t 1
X r=0
Pr (m t = r) 1 r + 1 ! .
Comparing these expressions one …nds EP E (C 0 ; t) < EP E (C; t). From equation 1 we see that the expected prediction error for objects in the other categories are una¤ected so EP E (C 0 ; t) < EP E (C; t). Hence the categorization with a convex category is better than the one with a non-convex category.
We know that an optimal categorization with k concepts has X i = [a i ; b i ) for i 2 f1; :::; k 1g and X k = [a k ; b k ] = [a k ; 1]. Letting d i = b i a i , we seek a categorization that minimizes
so the left hand side (LHS) of the FOC is increasing in d. Now if we increase then the LHS increases so in order to satisfy the FOC one has to decrease d. If we increase 2 then the LHS decreases and so in order to satisfy the FOC one has to increase d.
Proof of Proposition 8. (i)
Suppose that there is a categorization C 0 such that a subset A X is not categorized, in the sense that A has an empty intersection with any category in C 00 . Then the expected prediction error for objects in A, with expectation taken over the set of objects, is
f (yjx 2 A) (y ŷ t ) 2 dy. Taking expectation over the set of data bases of size t 1 we have EP E A (C 0 ; t) = V ar (y A ) + E (ŷ t A ) 2 .
(ii) If, in categorization C 00 , A is instead categorized as one separate category then the expected prediction error for objects in A, with expectation taken over the set of data bases of size t 1, is EP E A (C 00 ; t) = V ar (y A ) 1 + If A 6 = then E (ŷ t At ) 2 > 0 for all t so that for su¢ ciently large t we have EP E A (C 00 ; t) < EP E A (C 0 ; t). If instead A = then E (ŷ t A ) 2 = V ar (ŷ t ) = 1 t 1 V ar (y) .
Also note E (ŷ t A ) 2 jm At = 0 = V ar (ŷ t jm At = 0) > V ar (ŷ t ) = 1 t 1 V ar (y) .
Thus for A = we have EP E A (C 00 ; t) EP E A (C 0 ; t)
Pr (m At = r) 1 r + Pr (m At = 0) E (ŷ t A ) 2 jm At = 0 1 t 1 V ar (y)
Pr (m At = r) 1 r (1 Pr (m At = 0)) 1 t 1 V ar (y) .
We have V ar (y A ) < V ar (y). Still, as t ! 1 both P t 1 r=1 Pr (m At = r) 1 r and 1 t 1 go to zero, but the latter does so faster than the former; formally It follows that for su¢ ciently large t we have EP E A (C 00 ; t) > EP E A (C 0 ; t) when A = . Hence in this case it is better not to categorize A -i.e. have a categorization all of whose categories have an empty intersection with A. These results are about what categorizations that minimize EP E (C; t) for su¢ ciently large t. Clearly they are readily reformulated as statements about what categorizations that minimize EP E (C; T; L) for su¢ ciently large L.
